Unmasking the Dark Web: How Infostealers Convert Stolen Credentials into Real Identities

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Infostealers’ Sophisticated Credential Theft: Uncovering the Threat to Identity and Access

Infostealers have significantly expanded their scope of operation, moving beyond mere username and password harvesting. These modern malware campaigns have accelerated, targeting both corporate employees and individuals, with little distinction between personal and professional devices.

The Threat to Identity and Access

The resulting datasets, often containing credentials, browser cookies, browsing history, and system-level files, are aggregated and sold to initial access brokers, who then reuse them across various attacks targeting both personal and enterprise environments.

Researchers analyzed over 90,000 leaked infostealer dumps, comprising more than 800 million rows of data collected during active infections. The analysis revealed a clear picture of how infostealer dumps enable attackers to associate technical data with real users, organizations, and behavioral patterns.

This convergence of personal and professional identity poses a significant risk, as a single infection can quickly escalate into enterprise-level risk.

Credentials and Session Data

The datasets contained credentials and session data associated with a wide range of services, including professional and enterprise-linked services like GitHub, Microsoft Teams, and Outlook.

These services often provide a direct path from stolen data to real names, job titles, and organizational affiliations. Threat actors can use this information to launch targeted phishing, social engineering, and prioritized access attacks, especially where password reuse exists.

Personal Identity and Social Platforms

Personal identity and social platforms like YouTube, Facebook, and LinkedIn also appeared frequently in the dataset, containing real names, photos, and social connections.

This correlation makes targeted exploitation far easier, as attackers can validate the identity of a compromised user and link them to other accounts.

Sensitive and High-Risk Services

Sensitive and high-risk services, including government and tax-related domains like the IRS and the Canada Revenue Agency, as well as adult content platforms, were also present in the dataset.

Access to these services introduces risks beyond traditional account takeover, such as extortion and blackmail.

Technical Awareness and Immunity

The analysis highlights that technical awareness does not equal immunity. Even domains like Shodan and mil.gov appeared within the dataset, reinforcing the reality that secure practices followed in corporate environments do not always extend to personal systems.

Exposure on personal systems can still create enterprise risk.

Infostealer Exposure

Infostealer exposure is often driven by a combination of common behaviors repeated at scale, such as installing applications from illicit sources, reusing passwords across personal and corporate accounts, and relying on browser-based credential storage for convenience.

Browser-stored credentials and payment data are especially valuable to attackers, providing immediate access to high-value information and increasing the impact of a single infection.

Mitigation Measures

To reduce the impact of credential theft, it is essential to assume that some credentials are already exposed. Effective mitigation measures include disrupting password reuse, which remains one of the most reliable ways attackers operationalize infostealer data.

Implementing stronger password policies that support longer passphrases and continuous enforcement can help shift password security from a static configuration exercise to an active containment measure.

Ultimately, reducing the reuse and downstream impact of stolen credentials remains one of the most effective ways to break infostealer-driven attack chains.

This requires a proactive approach to password security, including continuous scanning of Active Directory against known-compromised credentials and blocking credentials that have already been exposed.



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